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NOTES AND COMMENTS

so long as both the entrant and his informer are acting under a
business duty. 9 The court's prohibition of multiple hearsay was
statements made by a
obviously meant to exclude any extra-judicial
40
patient referring to the cause of his injury.
In view of the court's liberal opinion in the Sims case, it would
seem that in the future the only obstacle preventing more frequent
use of hospital records as evidence will be the physician-patient
privilege. But, now that it is clear that such records may be admitted, perhaps the trial judge will closely examine them and not
hesitate to exercise the discretion granted him to disclose the privileged communication "if in his opinion it is necessary to a proper
administration of justice."'"
S. EPES ROBINSON
Evidence-Physician-Patient Privilege-Compelling Disclosure of
Privileged Information-Discretion of the Trial Judge
While at common law no privilege was recognized for communications between patient and physician,' North Carolina and over
thirty other states3 have by statute created such a privilege. The
"E.g., Breneman Co. v. Cunningham, 207 N.C. 77, 175 S.E. 829 (1934) ;
Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 138 N.C. 42, 50 S.E. 452
(1905), where record entries made by a train dispatcher based upon information obtained from a station agent 100 miles away were admissible to
show the position of a train at a given time.
,0 See note 20 supra.
,N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953), in addition to establishing the physician-patient privilege, provides that the trial judge may order the disclosure
of such privileged communications in order to facilitate a proper administration of justice. This provision in the statute was enacted to provide against
an injustice resulting from the suppression of evidence by the patient's
claim of privilege. In Sins, the Supreme Court, recognizing the legislature's
intended purpose in making this provision, cast considerable doubt upon the
soundness of the trial judge's decision not to compel disclosure of the record.
' "If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure, he
would be guilty of a breach of honor and of great indiscretion; but to give
that information in a court of justice, which by the law of the land he is
bound to do, will never be imputed to him as any indiscretion whatever."
The Duchess of Kingston's Trial, 20 How. St. Trials 573 (1776). See also
Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 116 S.E.2d 137 (1960); State v. Martin, 182
N.C. 846, 849, 109 S.E. 74, 76 (1921) ; STANSBURY, EvIDENCE § 63 (1946).
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953).
North Carolina enacted its privilege
statute in 1885 and it has remained in its original form, without amendment, to date. A similar statutory privilege is also provided for communications between clergymen and communicants. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.1
(Supp. 1961).
' New York in 1828 became the first state to depart from the commonlaw rule and provide for the privilege. Since then over two-thirds of the
states have enacted similar legislation. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380
n.5 (McNaughton rev. 1961) where these statutes are compiled and quoted.
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avowed object of the privilege is to inspire confidence in the patient
and encourage him to make full and frank disclosure to the physician
4
as to his symptoms and conditions.
This privilege has often been criticized on the ground that it
deprives the courts of relevant and reliable facts which in many
cases would materially affect the outcome of litigation. The usefulness of such legislation has been further questioned by the contention that the object of the privilege-to encourage disclosure to the
physician-is unrealistic. It is argued that seldom would a person be
deterred from seeking medical aid and disclosing his conditions
merely because of the possibility that such information could be used
in a subsequent judicial hearing.'
The North Carolina General Assembly has enacted what is
acclaimed by some as the most desirable form of a privilege statute.(
By recognizing that the privilege may hamper the proper administration of justice by concealing the entire truth, but at the same time
realizing that a patient must be able to place the utmost faith and
confidence in his attending physician, a delicate balance was struck.
The North Carolina statute provides:
No person, duly authorized to practice physic or surgery,
shall be required to disclose any information which he may
have acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him
to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or to do any act
for him as a surgeon: Provided, that the presiding judge

'Yow v. Pittman, 241 N.C. 69, 84 S.E.2d 297 (1954); State v. Martin,
182 N.C. 846, 109 S.E. 74 (1921). The New York Commissioners on Revision stated with respect to the privilege, "unless such consultations are
privileged men will be incidentally punished by being obligated to suffer
the consequences of injuries without relief from the medical art." Quoted
in MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 101, at 212 n.6 (1954). The North Carolina
privilege statute is adapted from the original New York statute.
But see MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra at 212 where the author states with
reference to the theory of "full and frank disclosure" to the physician as the
basis of the privilege: "if this were the only interest involved it is hard to
suppose that the desire for privacy would outweigh the need for complete
presentation of the facts in the interest of justice."
See 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 2380(a); Chaffee, Privileged
Communications: Is .Tustice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's
Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943); Purrington, An
Abused Privilege, 6 COLUm. L. REv. 388 (1906).
' See 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2381, at 832. The American
Bar Association Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence, in
1937-38, recommended retention of the physician-patient privilege, but with
the addition of the North Carolina exception.
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of a superior court may compel such disclosure, if in his
opinion the same is necessary to a proper administration of
justice.'
By allowing the trial judge, in his discretion, to compel disclosure
of what would normally be privileged information, it is generally
felt that the evils of a physician-patient privilege are minimized.'
Nevertheless, the recent case of Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co.' vividly illustrates that such is not always the case.
In Sims the beneficiary sued to recover the proceeds of a life

insurance policy. The defendant contended it was only obligated to
refund the premiums because the insured had made material misrepresentations in the application for insurance which was the basis
for the issuance of the policy. The defense was based on hospital
records which showed that "the insured, nineteen days after she
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
In order for the privilege to exist, there must exist the relation of physician and patient at the time the information in question is obtained. State v.
Wade, 197 N.C. 571, 150 S.E. 32 (1929); State v. Newsome, 195 N.C. 552,
143 S.E. 187 (1928); State v. Martin, 182 N.C. 846, 109 S.E. 74 (.1921).
The information sought to be suppressed on the grounds of privilege must
be information which was necessary to enable the physician to perform his

professional services for the patient.

Non-confidential matters are thus

apparently not privileged. Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 116 S.E.2d 137
(1960); State v. Newsome, supra; State v. Martin. supra; Smith v. John L.
Roper Lumber Co., 147 N.C. 62, 60 S.E. 717 (1908). The privilege will
extend to all information obtained by the physician for the purpose of prescribing for the patient regardless of whether such information is received
by direct communication from the patient himself, or is obtained by the
physician through his own examination and observation. Smith v. John L.
Roper Lumber Co., supra. The privilege is that of the patient alone and
cannot be taken advantage of by another. Capps v. Lynch, supra; State v.
Wade, supra; State v. Martin, supra. The privilege may be waived by the
patient, or after the patient's death, by his personal representative. For a
discussion of the problem of waiver, see Note, 16 N.C.L. Rav. 53 (1937).
If the trial judge decides to exercise his statutory power, and compel disclosure of what would otherwise be privileged information, a finding that
the disclosure is necessary "to a proper administration of justice" must
appear on the record. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Boddie, 194 N.C. 199,
139 S.E. 228 (1927), discussed in Note, 6 N.C.L. REV. 85 (1927).
' In McCoRmICK, op. cit. supra note 4,.§ 108, at 224, the author states
with respect to the North Carolina privilege statute: "A clear-eyed and
courageous judiciary, trial and appellate, with an appreciation of the need
for truth and a fear of the suppression, could draw the danger of injustice
from the privilege, under this provision."
The Virginia privilege statute similarly provides that the trial judge may
compel disclosure of what would otherwise be privileged communications if
such is felt to be necessary in the interest of justice. VA. CoDs ANN. § 8289.1 (Supp. 1962). The remainder of the privilege statutes in effect in
other jurisdictions, do not provide for such an exception.
p257 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962).
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applied for insurance and five days after issuance of the policy, was
suffering from cirrhosis, chronic pancreatitis, tubular nephrosis and
chronic alcoholism" ;10 whereas in the application, the insured represented that she was in good health, and had never had heart or
kidney trouble, high blood pressure, or any other disease not specifically mentioned. The trial court excluded these hospital records
without assigning any reason for its ruling. 1 To this exclusion an
exception was taken, and the insurance company, appealing from an
adverse verdict, claimed such exclusion to be error.
When evidence is excluded by the trial court without assigning
a reason for its ruling, and the question of the admissibility of such
is the basis of an appeal, the lower court's ruling will be affirmed if
the evidence in question was inadmissible on any legal ground.' 2
Thus in Sims if the hospital records were inadmissible for any
reason, there was no error. The plaintiff on appeal claimed that the
records were properly excluded on the grounds of (1) hearsay, and
(2) privileged communication between patient and physician.' The
court rejected the first contention, stating that even though the
hospital records were hearsay, they were nevertheless admissible
under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.' 4 The
court held, however, that the records did constitute privileged communications between physician and patient and accordingly affirmed
the exclusion. 5
"Old. at 39, 125 S.E.2d at 331.
"Id. at 34, 125 S.E.2d at 328; Record, p. 18, Sims v. Charlotte Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962).
"5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1464(3) (1958); cf. Temple v. Temple,
246 N.C. 334, 98 S.E.2d 314 (1957); State v. Fleming, 204 N.C. 40, 167
S.E. 483 (1932).
1It should be noted that on appeal, the defendant insurance company
confined its argument with respect to the hospital records to the question of
hearsay. No argument on the question of exclusion on the grounds of
privilege was made.
14 The fact that the hospital records were admissible under the business
records exception to the hearsay rule is discussed in Note, 41 N.C.L. REV.
621 (1963).
There is some controversy over whether hospital records should constitute communications between physician and patient and be subject to the
privilege. The court, in holding that G.S. § 8-53 did apply to hospital records insofar as they contain entries made by the attending physician or
surgeon, or under their direction, first noted that the statute "extends not
only to information orally communicated by the patient, but to knowledge
obtained by the physician or surgeon through his own observation or examination while attending the patient in a professional capacity and which was
necessary to enable him to prescribe." Quoting from Smith v. John L. Roper
Lumber Co., 147 N.C. 62, 64, 60 S.E. 717, 71 (1908). The construction
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The inequities of the Sims decision are apparent. Evidence
which would tend to show a misrepresentation sufficient to invalidate the insurance policy'" was suppressed because of the physicianpatient privilege. It is indeed questionable whether the benefits to
be derived by the deceased-insured keeping his infirmities confidential
outweigh the benefits to be gained, in the form of substantial justice,
from a full disclosure of the factsY It would seem that the present
placed on the statute by the court in Smith was dictum, but it has been
accepted and repeated by the court in later cases. See, e.g., Brittain v.
Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 254 N.C. 697, 120 S.E.2d 72 (1961). The court
further relied upon Annot., 22 A.L.R. 1217 (1923) wherein it is stated that
the privilege extends to a hospital physician. It was felt that if a hospital
physician was incompetent personally to testify, then information obtained
by him and recorded in records was similarly inadmissible. The court was
careful to limit their holding to entries made by the physician, or under his
direction, which pertain to communications and information obtained in
attending the patient, such information being necessary to enable him to
prescribe for the patient. "Any other information contained in the records,
if relevant and otherwise competent, is not privileged. The effect of the
statute is not extended to include nurses, technicians, and others, unless they
were assisting or acting under the direction of a physician or surgeon."
257 N.C. at 38, 125 S.E.2d at 331.
Justices Higgins and Parker concurred in the result, but felt that G.S.
§ 8-53 should not apply to hospital records. Justice Higgins states: "To me,
the exclusion of hospital records is as out-of-date as the bustle, asafoetida,
and the tomahawk. The statute does not require the exclusion unless a modern hospital is a person duly authorized to practice physic, and then only as
to information he may have acquired." 257 N.C. at 42, 125 S.E.2d at 334.
The majority of the jurisdictions hold that hospital records do constitute
privileged information insofar as they contain data acquired by the attending
physician or under his direction. See McComicxiC, op. cit. supra note 4, §
290, at 613; 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2382, at 839; Annots., 75
A.L.R. 378 (1931); 120 A.L.R. 1124 (1939); cf. Annots., 44 A.L.R.2d 553
(1955); 79 A.L.R.2d 890, 914 (1961).
"6The insurance policy in question provided: "I agree that no obligation
shall exist against said Company... unless upon said delivery of the policy
I shall be alive and in good health." Even absence such a provision in the
policy, it has been held that a misrepresentation of the type involved is a
material misrepresentation and is sufficient to invalidate the policy. Tolbert
v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 236 N.C. 416, 72 S.E.2d 915 (1952).
17 In actual practice the evidence is concealed only from the jury. In
the present case the contents of the hospital records were revealed to the
attorneys and the presiding judge, as well as all in the court room; for as is
the usual practice with objectional evidence, the jury was sent out and the
evidence presented so that the judge might rule on it. The contents of the
hospital records not only appear in the Superior Court Record, but also are
found in the Supreme Court Report of the case. Thus in reality, the only
object served by the exclusion is to prevent the jury from knowing the
truth at the time of the trial. How is the patient then benefited by the
privilege-possibly only in the form of an unjust insurance claim allowed
because of suppression of evidence.
The insurance company could have protected itself in one of two ways.
It could have included a waiver clause in the policy providing that the
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case was one in which the trial judge should have, in the exercise of
his discretion, required disclosure for the proper administration of
justice. The supreme court was apparently of the same opinion, for
they clearly intimate in their opinion that it would have been proper
for the trial judge to exercise his discretionary authority and allow
the hospital records into evidence. Foreseeing possible inequities in
the future because of the privilege, the court further stated "judges
should not hesitate to require the disclosure where it appears to
them to be necessary in order that the truth be known and justice
be done.""
Why did the supreme court refuse to overrule the trial court's
exclusion in view of the recognized injustice resulting from the exclusion of the records? The court assigned as its reason "the absence of a finding by the trial court that in its opinion, the admission
of the hospital records was necessary to a proper administration
of justice"' 9 and without such a finding, the court felt that it was
bound to hold the exclusion without error.
It can be argued that, under the circumstances, the absence of
a finding of necessity by the trial judge should not bind the court
on appeal. When evidence is excluded at the trial without reason,
such exclusion will be affirmed on appeal if excludable on any
ground. Thus in Sims the court was required to consider all possible grounds for exclusion. There being only one ground for exclusion-the physician-patient privilege-since hearsay was eliminated,
the question was whether or not it was permissible for the trial
judge to exclude the records on this ground. An argument may be
constructed that such an exclusion would be error.
If privileged communication was the basis of the trial court's
exclusion, the presumption on appeal is that the court made this
ruling in the exercise of its discretion rather than as a matter of
law.2" While a discretionary order of the trial judge is generally
physician-patient privilege is waived in certain cases. The use of such a
clause is discussed in Note, 16 N.C.L. Rxv. 53 (1937). The insurance company could also have required a physical examination prior to the issuance
of the policy. Because of the low value of the policy, no medical exam was
required in the present case.
18257 N.C. 32, 39, 125 S.E.2d 326, 331.
1 Id. at 39, 125
S.E.2d at 332.
0
Brittain v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 254 N.C. 697, 703, 120 S.E.2d 72,
76 (1961). It is clear that if the trial judge excluded the evidence as a
matter of law, rather than in the exercise of its discretion, the exclusion
would be in error. Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 116 S.E.2d 137 (1960).
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conclusive on appeal, such is not the case if the trial judge appears
to have abused his discretionary authority. 2 Thus in Sims the
court on appeal could well have concluded that if the trial judge
excluded the records because of privilege-and it will be presumed
that such exclusion is the result of an exercise of discretion-he
abused his discretion. The records were hence not excludable on
the grounds of privilege. This would be a desirable result for it
would seem to be clearly an abuse of discretion to fail to compel
disclosure of evidence which would materially alter the outcome of
the litigation involved.
In an earlier North Carolina case the court was faced with an
almost identical fact situation. In Creech v. Sovereign Camp of the
Woodmen of the World22 the defendant denied liability on an insurance policy on the grounds of misrepresentations of a material
character in an application for insurance. The insured had claimed
that he had suffered no disease within the past five years. The defendant sought to introduce into evidence testimony of a physician
which would have shown that he had treated the insured in recent
years. The trial judge excluded this testimony on the grounds of
privilege, and further refused in the exercise of his discretion to
require disclosure. On appeal, the exclusion was affirmed. While
it could be argued that the effect of this decision is to hold that a
refusal to compel a physician's testimony which shows a misrepresentation on an insurance policy application does not constitute an
abuse of discretion, such does not in fact appear to be the impact of
this decision. In Creech the evidence showed that the insured died
of pneumonia contracted due to exposure on a hunting trip. The
" While there has thus far been no case in which a trial court's exclusion
of evidence on the grounds of privilege has been reversed because of an
abuse of discretion, it is nevertheless felt that such is the rule. With respect
to other discretionary rulings by the trial judge, the rule is clearly established that such are subject to review and reversal in cases of an abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., Ponder v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962);
Goldston v. Wright, 257 N.C. 279, 125 S.E.2d 462 (1962); State v. Grundler, 251 N.C. 177, 111 S.E.2d 1 (1959); In the Matter of Humphrey, 236
N.C. 142, 71 S.E.2d 915 (1952); Elliott v. Swartz Indus., Inc., 231 N.C.
425, 57 S.E.2d 305 (1949). See generally 1 STRONG, N.C. INDEX Appeal &
Error § 46 (1957).
The Virginia privilege statute (see note 8 su*pra) which similarly vests
discretionary power in the trial judge to compel disclosure has not been
interpreted on this point.
211 N.C. 658, 191 S.E. 840 (1937). While there is language in this
case to the effect that a discretionary ruling of a trial judge is not reviewable, it is believed that the rule is otherwise in cases of an abunse of discretion. See note 21 supra.
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death was in no way connected with the misrepresentation in the
insurance application. In fact the court stated: "We cannot see how
defendant was prejudiced by the exclusion of the evidence of the
physician." 23 Thus this case simply seems to be one in which the
court on appeal felt that the interests of justice would not be promoted by requiring disclosure by the physician, and consequently
there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to admit the testimony
into evidence.2 4
In the principal case the misrepresentations were directly related
to the cause of death-the death was actually the result of a disease
which the insured represented he did not have. Thus Sims presents a much stronger case for reversal on the grounds of abuse of
discretion than did the Creech case where the death was unrelated to
the insured's misrepresentations.
While the inequities of the Sims case may be more academic
than real in that a new trial was granted on other grounds,2" it
may nevertheless represent an unfortunate precedent for the exclusion of physician-patient information. It is hoped that in the future
the court will not consider this case as a binding precedent for the
proposition that privileged information such as here, which will
materially affect the outcome of the litigation, may nevertheless be
excluded by the trial judge and such exclusion is not subject to
review. Had the court on appeal adopted the procedure suggested
in reviewing the exclusion of the hospital records, possible confusion
as to the meaning of this decision would have been avoided, and the
delicate balance of interests embodied in the North Carolina privilege statute would have been preserved.
G.B.H.
Outlawry: Another "Gothic Column" in North Carolina
Once one of the law's most potent weapons, outlawry has been
relegated in modern society to an existence as an historian's curiosity.
It is obsolete in England and exists in any form in only three of the
United States.
2 Id.at 662, 191 S.E. at 843.
"In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Boddie, 196 N.C. 666. 146 S.E. 598
(1929) there is also language which would seem to intimate that exclusion
of medical testimony tending to show misrepresentations by the insured on
his application is not an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Ho~vever,
this language is dictum in that this was not the issue raised and decided by
the appeal.
.'The new trial was granted for an error in the charge.

